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The new Constitution of Zimbabwe2 was drafted in 
the wake of what was arguably the country’s most 
violent election.3 Much of the violence had been 
perpetrated against women.4 When President Robert 
Mugabe signed the new Constitution into law on 22 
May 2013, for the first time in the nation’s history 
the supreme law of the land enshrined a right to 
‘freedom from all forms of violence from public or 
private sources’.5 Although Zimbabwe’s previous 
Constitution did have a Declaration of Rights, it did 
not include the right to freedom from violence and 
generally was less extensive than the new Declaration 
of Rights. The criminal law was, therefore, the primary 
legal means of protecting women from violence. In all 
likelihood this will continue to be the case following 
the adoption of the new Constitution. However, the 
inclusion of the right to freedom from all forms of 
violence in the supreme law of Zimbabwe, to which 
the criminal law is subject, means that the criminal 
law may need to be amended, moulded and shaped 
in order to better give effect to this right.6 
The right, therefore, has huge potential for advancing 
women’s rights and addressing violence against 
women in Zimbabwe.7 However, as observed by a 
key civil society leader, Netsai Mushonga, ‘[w]hile 
we applaud the successful end to the constitution-
making, this ushers in the more difficult exercise of 
constitution-building, ensuring that rights become 
reality for women’.8 This article seeks to make a 
contribution to that difficult task by considering how 
the right to freedom from all forms of violence can be 
used to encourage the reform of Zimbabwe’s rape 
law. 
First, the nature and prevalence of rape in Zimbabwe 
will be considered. Next, I will discuss the importance 
of the right to freedom from violence for the law 
reform agenda. Lastly, I explore how the right can be 
The right to ‘freedom from all forms of violence from public or private sources’, enshrined in Zimbabwe’s new 
Constitution, could have a significant impact on efforts to end violence against women (VAW) in the country. The 
right is particularly relevant in the Zimbabwean context where VAW occurs in a range of settings, from the most 
intimate of relationships in the home to the state’s use of rape as a political weapon. One way in which the state 
can fulfil its duty to address VAW is through the reform of the country’s rape law. With comparative reference 
to the impact of the right to freedom from violence in South African law, this article discusses three areas of 
Zimbabwean law that present potential obstacles to achieving justice for rape survivors: the definition of the 
crime of rape, the abolished but tenacious cautionary rule, and the sentencing of sexual offenders.1 
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brought to bear on three aspects of the criminal law 
that present potential obstacles to justice for rape 
survivors, namely the definition of rape, the cautionary 
rule and sentencing of offenders. 
Rape perpetration in Zimbabwe
The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency provides 
statistics for reported cases of rape. According 
to figures released for the fourth quarter of 2013, 
reported rapes from the previous four years were 
as follows: 3 481 in 2009, 4 450 in 2010, 5 446 in 
2011, 5 412 in 2012 and 4 735 in 2013 (excluding 
November and December).9 These statistics are 
based on police records and therefore must be 
regarded with extreme caution. It is widely recognised 
that rape is underreported globally.10 Police statistics 
are sometimes rendered even more unreliable 
in developing countries, where there is limited 
infrastructure for crime reporting.11 Research in  
Zimbabwe further shows that reporting is negatively 
affected by societal perceptions of rape, especially 
marital rape.12 Politically motivated rape is also less 
likely to be reported, especially if the crime was 
committed by the police themselves.13 Nevertheless, 
these figures provide some basis for assessing the 
prevalence of rape in Zimbabwe. The Research 
and Advocacy Unit has estimated, based on these 
statistics, that ‘[f]ifteen (15) women are raped in 
Zimbabwe every day – one in every 90 minutes’.14 
Given the reality of low reporting levels, the situation 
is probably much worse. 
In Zimbabwe rape has been perpetrated both by 
private persons, often including those close to the 
rape survivor, as well as by the state and the state’s 
agencies, such as the police and the army. Studies 
show that politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe 
has been perpetrated by the state, and, when 
perpetrated by private parties, has sometimes been 
state sanctioned.15 According to a number of civil 
society sources, rape has been used as a political 
weapon in Zimbabwe.16 There are reports of politically 
motivated rapes occurring during the liberation war 
of the 1970s,17 and being perpetrated by the army 
(especially the Fifth Brigade) during the ‘disturbances’ 
of the 1980s known as Gukurahundi.18 Since 2000, 
according to the Research and Advocacy Unit, 
politically motivated violence, including rape, has 
primarily occurred during elections.19 
A survey conducted between 2005 and 2006 among 
8 907 women between the ages 15 and 49 indicated 
that a significant portion of Zimbabwean women had 
experienced domestic violence of a sexual nature. 
In the survey, ‘25 percent of women reported that 
they have experienced sexual violence at some point 
in their lives’.20 Furthermore, the ‘majority (65%) of 
women reported that their current or former husband, 
partner, or boyfriend committed the [first] act of 
sexual violence [against them]’.21  
The relevance of the right to ‘freedom 
from violence’ to rape law reform
Obligations under the due 
diligence standard
The concept of ‘due diligence’ has been imported 
into human rights law – particularly with regard 
to VAW – to assess whether the state has taken 
adequate measures to fulfil its duties to protect 
women.22 These duties have been acknowledged 
in Zimbabwe’s Constitution, which states that the 
state has a duty to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Declaration of Rights – including, 
of course, the right to freedom from all forms of 
violence.23 The former United Nations Special 
Rapporteur for Violence against Women, its Causes 
and Consequences, Yakin Ertürk, outlined numerous 
steps that states should take in order to fulfil these 
obligations. This article will focus on just two of 
these, namely the reform of the criminal law24 and 
the administration of punishment for perpetrators 
of rape as a form of VAW.25 The legislature has an 
important role to play in fulfilling these duties, as the 
primary arm of government tasked with law reform 
by passing new legislation and making amendments 
to existing laws.26 The judiciary also has a role in the 
law reform process by developing the common law 
in line with the Constitution27 and striking down any 
unconstitutional legislation.28 The judiciary is also the 
arm of government that administers punishment to 
those who violate the right to freedom from violence, 
by sentencing those convicted of violent crimes, such 
as rape, under the criminal law. 
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The influence of the right in 
South African law
Section 52(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
states that ‘every person has the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, which includes the right … 
to freedom from all forms of violence from public or 
private sources’. An almost identical right is found 
in section 12(1)(c) of the South African Constitution, 
which states that ‘everyone has the right to freedom 
and security of the person, which includes the right 
… to be free from all forms of violence from either 
public or private source’.29 For this reason, the South 
African experience will be valuable in informing how 
the right can be used in Zimbabwe. The South 
African experience is also relevant for at least two 
other reasons: firstly, as a neighbouring country to 
Zimbabwe, South Africa has a similar history and 
context as well as similar cultures; secondly, both 
countries’ legal systems have their roots in Roman-
Dutch law and English common law and refer to each 
other’s case law. 
In 1998, Helene Combrinck wrote an influential paper 
on how the inclusion of this right in South Africa’s 
new Constitution could be used in the fight to end 
VAW in South Africa.30 According to Combrinck, 
what is of particular importance for addressing VAW 
is that the right is framed to include violence from 
both public and private sources.31 This is because 
human rights have traditionally been regarded as only 
protecting the individual from the abuses of the state, 
or ‘public sources’.32 This legal tradition has long 
undermined the protection of women from violence, 
since the source of VAW is very often a private one.33  
The right to freedom from violence has been 
instrumental in the reform of rape law, both through 
legislative reforms and through the development of 
the common law by the courts. The Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act 2007,34 which introduced a number of key 
reforms to South African rape law, was founded on 
the right to be free from all forms of violence, and 
other key constitutional rights such as the right to 
equality.35 The right has also influenced how the 
South African courts understand the purpose of the 
crime of rape. This is seen clearly in a judgement 
penned by Justice AJ Patel of the Venda High Court, 
which states:
The modern function of the crime of rape … 
is the protection of women from sexualised 
violence. It is not so much as it involves unlawful 
sexual intercourse as the fact that it involves 
an invasion and infringement of a woman’s 
fundamental rights as a person ... [such as] her 
right to be free from all forms of violence …36 
In light of the above, the South African experience 
will be relevant to understanding the potential impact 
of the right to freedom from violence on each of the 
three areas of Zimbabwe’s criminal law as discussed 
below, namely the definition of the crime of rape, 
the cautionary rule and the sentencing of sexual 
offenders.
The definition of rape
Much of the debate around the reform of South 
Africa’s rape law has centred on the definition of 
rape.37 This is an area of the law that also needs 
reform in Zimbabwe. The definition of rape in 
Zimbabwean law is found in section 65(1) of the 
Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act 2004 and 
is framed as follows:
If a male person knowingly has sexual 
intercourse or anal sexual intercourse with 
a female person and, at the time of the 
intercourse … the female person has not 
consented to it … and … he knows that she 
has not consented to it or realises that there is 
a real risk or possibility that she may not have 
consented to it … he shall be guilty of rape and 
liable to imprisonment for life or any shorter 
period.38 
The definition is fairly comprehensive, but it is not 
without its problems. Firstly, the definition of rape, 
read with the definitions of sexual intercourse 
and anal sexual intercourse,39 restricts the types 
of penetration to vaginal or anal penetration of a 
woman by a man’s penis. Therefore, other types of 
coerced penetration, such as oral penetration, or 
vaginal and anal penetration by objects other than a 
penis, are excluded from the definition. These types 
of coerced penetration fall under a different crime – 
aggravated indecent assault.40 Although aggravated 
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indecent assault carries the same penalty as rape, 
it has been argued that the exclusion of these types 
of penetration from the definition of rape fails to 
recognise that ‘the trauma of the victim is equally 
severe in all instances of penetration’ and implicitly 
labels such acts of penetration a lesser crime.41  
Secondly, the definition of rape is gendered: only men 
can be perpetrators of rape and only women can 
be victims of rape. Not only does this raise serious 
constitutional concerns relating to discrimination 
against men and boys who are raped, but who 
are not legally considered to have been raped, but 
additionally the gendered definition of rape has its 
roots in patriarchal considerations. The common law 
crime of rape was originally conceived as a property 
crime against men.42 Furthermore, it has been 
argued that the idea that only women can be raped 
perpetuates the patriarchal conception of rape as a 
‘metonym of feminised victimhood’.43 
Should the courts declare the 
definition unconstitutional?
While it is clearly arguable that the definition of 
rape in Zimbabwean law could be improved, the 
question remains whether it is unconstitutional. 
A similar question came before the South African 
Constitutional Court in Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions44 where the court was asked to 
decide whether the common law definition of rape, 
which excluded anal penetration of women and 
similarly discriminated on the grounds of sex, was 
unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court found 
that notwithstanding its deficiencies, the definition of 
rape ‘ensure[d] that the constitutional right to be free 
from all forms of violence, whether public or private, 
as well as the right to dignity and equality [were] 
protected’.45 The court held that the definition should 
be developed to include ‘acts of non-consensual 
penetration of a penis into the anus of a female’ in 
order to give effect to the spirit, objects and purport 
of the Bill of Rights but declined to extend the 
definition of rape in a gender-neutral way. 
If the Zimbabwean courts decide to follow Masiya 
then it may be that Zimbabwean law’s definition of 
rape may be found not to fall foul of the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe, which is similar in many respects to 
the South African Constitution. However, it should 
be noted that the Masiya judgement was widely 
criticised,46 and South African law’s definition of rape 
was amended through legislative intervention soon 
after the judgement was handed down in order to 
make the changes the court had failed to make. 
Therefore, Zimbabwean courts should not be overly 
influenced by the restrictive approach adopted 
in Masiya. Rather it is submitted that the courts 
should follow the approach to the interpretation 
of fundamental rights laid down by Zimbabwe’s 
Supreme Court in Smyth v Ushewokunze,47 where the 
Court stated that ‘[t]he endeavour of the Court should 
always be to expand the reach of a fundamental 
right than to attenuate its meaning or content’. This 
approach has been given added weight in light of 
section 46(1)(a) of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe, 
which binds the courts to give ‘full effect to the 
rights and freedoms enshrined in [the Declaration of 
Rights].’48  
Furthermore, in Zimbabwe Township Developers 
v Lou’s Shoes,49 the Supreme Court stressed 
that when considering whether a statute is 
unconstitutional ‘[o]ne doesn’t interpret the 
Constitution in a restricted manner in order to 
accommodate the challenged legislation’. Rather, 
stated the Court, ‘[t]he Constitution must be 
properly interpreted, after which the challenged 
legislation must be examined to discover whether 
it be interpreted to fit into the framework of the 
Constitution’. In light of the above, and in relation 
to the right to freedom from all forms of violence, 
it is suggested that Zimbabwean courts now 
have the opportunity to declare the criminal law’s 
distinction between different forms of coerced sexual 
penetration unconstitutional, given the appropriate 
case.
Legislative intervention needed?
Alternatively, the legislature could amend the 
definition of rape to make it gender-neutral and to 
extend it to all types of coerced sexual penetration.50 
Given that the definition of rape is contained in 
statute rather than in the common law, this is 
preferable. This could be done through amending the 
definition in Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) 
Act 2004 or by creating a separate Sexual Offences 
Act. Zimbabwe did previously have separate sexual 
35SA Crime QuArterly No. 50 • DeCemBer 2014
offences legislation, which included a definition 
of rape that was gender-neutral and applied to a 
broad range of types of sexual penetration. This 
Act was repealed by the Criminal Law (Codification 
and Reform) Act 2004, which codified the majority 
of Zimbabwe’s criminal offences in a single Act. 
Although there is some merit in having a single 
codified Act for criminal offences, it may be prudent 
for Zimbabwe to return to a system of dealing 
with sexual offences separately, given the unique 
challenges that sexual offences present and in light of 
the other legislative changes suggested below. In the 




The cautionary rule in relation to sexual offences is 
a rule of evidence that requires judicial officers to 
treat the evidence given by a complainant in a sexual 
offence case as inherently suspect, and therefore in 
need of corroboration.51 The rule seriously prejudices 
the success of the prosecutorial process in rape trials 
and is humiliating for sexual assault survivors.52 In 
Zimbabwe, the courts used to apply the cautionary 
rule using a two-stage test laid down in S v 
Mupfudza53 that has been summarised as follows: 
The first question to be asked by the court is: 
‘Is the complainant credible?’ If the answer is 
in the affirmative, the next question is: ‘Is there 
corroboration of or support for the evidence 
of the complainant?’ In other words, the court 
must not only believe the complainant, it must 
in addition be satisfied, by an application of the 
cautionary rule, whether it might still not have 
been deceived by a plausible witness.54 
Has the rule been abolished?
Heléne Combrinck’s 1998 article argued that the right 
to be free from all forms of violence would be key to 
ensuring the abolition of the cautionary rule in South 
African law.55 That very same year the rule was, 
arguably, abolished in South Africa by the Supreme 
Court in the case of S v Jackson.56 Two years after 
that, in the case of S v Banana,57 the Supreme Court 
of Zimbabwe expressly overruled S v Mupfudza and 
applied S v Jackson, abolishing the cautionary rule 
from Zimbabwean law. Nevertheless, the cautionary 
rule continues to threaten to unduly influence cases 
involving sexual offences. In South Africa, some 
judges, such as Justice Thring in S v Van der Ross,58 
have interpreted S v Jackson as merely abolishing 
the mandatory application of the cautionary rule to 
complainants in sexual cases, and continued to apply 
it on a discretionary basis.59 In Zimbabwe, although 
the higher courts have generally avoided applying 
the cautionary rule, there remains a concern that 
the courts may adopt the approach of S v Van der 
Ross (and thus resurrect the cautionary rule), since 
S v Banana stated that Zimbabwean courts should 
‘proceed in conformity with the approach advocated 
in South Africa’.60 
Ensuring the rule is no longer applied
South Africa’s legislature has now expressly 
abolished the cautionary rule through section 60 
of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters) Amendment Act.61 It may be advisable for 
Zimbabwe’s legislature to do the same in order to 
ensure clarity, especially in light of evidence that 
there is still confusion in Zimbabwe around the 
application of the cautionary rule. For example, 
Justice Musakwa’s judgement in S v Makomeke62 
reports that ‘[b]oth counsels submitted in their 
heads of argument that the trial court ought to have 
adopted the approach in S v Mupfudza supra in its 
assessment of the complainant’s evidence’.63 If, over 
a decade after S v Banana was handed down, there 
is still such confusion among Zimbabwean legal 
practitioners, it raises concern about what is being 
applied in the magistrates’ courts – usually the courts 
of first instance in rape cases – whose judgements 
are not reported.
However, it must be acknowledged that legislative 
interventions are no guarantee to ensuring that 
courts do not apply the rule. A recent study has 
indicated that South African judges are still applying 
the cautionary rule, despite its having been expressly 
abolished by the legislature.64 Therefore, there may 
have to be judicial training on this matter, in addition 
to legislative clarity, in order to finally do away with 
this tenacious and patriarchal rule.  
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The third and final issue, discussed in the next 
section, is the sentencing of offenders.
sentencing of sexual offenders
Rape sentencing in Zimbabwe
Sentencing of sexual offenders recently came under 
the spotlight in Zimbabwe when a motion was 
introduced in Parliament in February 2014, calling for 
mandatory minimum sentences of no less than 30 
years’ imprisonment for those convicted of rape.65 
At present, Zimbabwean law does not impose 
mandatory minimum sentences for the crime of rape. 
The courts are entitled to impose a life sentence for 
rape,66 but generally far more lenient sentences than 
that are administered, even in very serious cases of 
rape. For example, in S v Dhliwayo,67 the High Court 
reduced the sentence imposed by a magistrate 
to an effective sentence of four and a half years’ 
imprisonment for the rape of a girl estimated to be 
between 10 and 11 years of age.68 In reaching its 
decision the Court relied on a series of cases in which 
similarly lenient sentences had been administered for 
rape. 
One of the seminal Zimbabwean cases on sentencing 
in rape trials is Nemukuyu v S.69 The judgement 
sets out what the courts must take into account 
when sentencing persons convicted of rape. 
While the judgement is generally quite balanced, 
it nevertheless illustrates one of the problems 
in Zimbabwe’s rape sentencing legislation that 
perpetuates misconceptions about the nature of 
rape and encourages lenient sentencing. Section 
65(2) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) 
Act requires judges to take ‘the degree of force or 
violence used in the rape’ and ‘the extent of physical 
and psychological injury inflicted upon the person 
raped’ when sentencing. Therefore, in reaching its 
decision to reduce the magistrate’s sentence to an 
effective sentence of eight years’ imprisonment,70 the 
Court relied on mitigating evidence that the convicted 
man ‘did not use a lot of force … [h]e simply over 
powered the complainant, causing no further physical 
harm beside that he inflicted on her private parts’.71 
Such remarks exhibit a gross misunderstanding 
about the inherently forceful and violent nature of 
rape, especially in light of the fact that the rape 
survivor was only 12 years old when she was raped, 
and the convicted person, who was her grandfather, 
was meant to be looking after her (in loco parentis) at 
the time and thus was in a position of authority and 
protection over her.
South Africa’s mandatory minimum 
sentence legislation
South Africa has passed minimum sentence 
legislation to try to ensure that judges administer 
more severe and consistent sentences for a number 
of serious crimes, including rape. When rape is 
perpetrated under certain aggravating circumstances, 
a life sentence must be administered. One such 
aggravating circumstance is when the victim is 
under the age of 16 years. This lies in stark contrast 
to the sentences administered in S v Dhliwayo and 
Nemukuyu v S – where in both cases the victims 
were younger than 16 years. When there are no such 
aggravating circumstances, the minimum sentences 
for rape under South African legislation range from 
10 to 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment for first, second 
and third offences, respectively. This more nuanced 
approach presents a potential alternative to the 
blanket minimum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment 
for all instances of rape proposed by the motion 
submitted to the Zimbabwean Parliament.
Judges in South Africa may not derogate from the 
mandatory minimum sentences unless there are 
‘substantial and compelling reasons’ to do so.72 The 
legislation also outlines certain circumstances that 
may not constitute substantial or compelling reasons, 
one of which is ‘an apparent lack of physical injury 
to the complainant’.73 Although the ‘substantial and 
compelling reasons’ proviso has been inappropriately 
used by some South African judges to reduce 
sentences on spurious grounds – sometimes even 
directly contradicting the list of grounds that may not 
constitute substantial and compelling reasons – the 
legislation has led to an increase in the severity of 
sentences for rape in South Africa.74 
Does the right support the adoption 
of minimum sentences?
Two primary justifications for legislating mandatory 
minimum sentences for rape in Zimbabwe were 
put forward during the parliamentary debate. These 
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were, firstly, the need to send a strong message to 
the public that rape is a serious crime and, secondly, 
the argument that more severe sentences will act as 
a deterrent to potential perpetrators of rape. These 
sentiments are similar to the reasons put forward 
for the introduction and continuation of mandatory 
minimum sentences in South Africa.75 
In societies like Zimbabwe and South Africa, where 
sexual violence against women has been normalised, 
it is important to send a strong message to society 
that rape is a heinous crime, and that those who 
perpetrate rape will be punished harshly.76 The 
right to freedom from violence adds weight to this 
argument, as rape can no longer be viewed as just a 
crime – it is also a violation of a fundamental human 
right. Additionally, the disproportionate impact that 
rape has on women means that the crime engages 
the constitutional dimensions of equality and dignity. 
Testimonials from rape survivors in South Africa 
indicate that ‘lenient sentences make survivors feel 
like their lives  are “cheap,” that they have been 
exposed to tremendous injustice, and that they are 
left exposed to intimidation and threats’.77 Therefore, 
increasing the severity of punishments administered 
to perpetrators of rape through minimum 
sentence legislation may serve as a much needed 
acknowledgement of the seriousness of the crime 
and the severity of its impact on rape survivors.
An evaluation of the efficacy of minimum sentence 
legislation as a deterrent is very important for the 
purposes of this article – if the right to freedom 
from violence is to be used as a justification for 
introducing such legislation then it is important 
that the legislation should be aimed at reducing 
the perpetration of rape in Zimbabwe, and thus 
protecting women from violence. In light of this, it is 
important to acknowledge that research suggests 
that increasing the severity of sentences does 
not seem to have a significant deterrent effect on 
the rate of commission of crimes targeted by the 
increased sentences.78 Sloth-Nielsen and Ehlers’ 
2005 paper assessing the impact of South Africa’s 
minimum sentence legislation concludes that ‘at 
present, there is little reliable evidence that the new 
sentencing law has reduced crime in general, or that 
specific offences targeted by this law have been 
curbed’.79 A number of studies have suggested that 
the severity of a punishment may have less influence 
on its efficacy as a deterrent than the certainty that a 
punishment will be administered and the celerity of its 
administration.80 Therefore, if deterrence is the goal, 
it may be more effective to focus on streamlining the 
criminal justice system to ensure the swift and certain 
administration of justice in rape trials, rather than to 
increase sentences.
Therefore, in reaching its decision on whether 
to introduce mandatory minimum sentences, 
Zimbabwe’s legislature will need to balance the 
importance of sending a strong message to society 
about the seriousness of the crime of rape, with the 
lack of conclusive evidence on the deterrent effect of 
such legislation.81  
Addressing misconceptions 
about rape
Whether or not the legislature decides to adopt 
mandatory minimum sentencing, Zimbabwe’s 
sentencing guidelines must be amended to avoid 
the perpetuation of misconceptions about rape. It 
is submitted that either section 65(2) be amended 
such that ‘the degree of force or violence used in the 
rape’ and ‘the extent of physical and psychological 
injury inflicted upon the person raped’ are removed 
from the list of factors that judges must take into 
account when sentencing. Alternatively, it should 
be specified that these factors may only be used 
as aggravating circumstances, because the way in 
which these factors have been applied by judges 
– as mitigating circumstances when they are not 
present – undermines the inherently violent and 
forceful nature of rape. It may be necessary for the 
legislature to go as far as the South African legislation 
and explicitly state that the lack of apparent injury 
to the complainant may not be used as grounds for 
reducing a sentence. Judicial training and education, 
as required by the due diligence standard,82 may also 
be necessary to address judges’ misconceptions 
about rape.
Conclusion
It is clear that the new Constitution could have a 
significant impact on the fight to end violence against 
women in Zimbabwe, through the reform of the 
country’s criminal law relating to rape. The right to 
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freedom from all forms of violence demands that the 
criminal law properly acknowledges women’s lived 
experiences of sexual violence, ensures a smooth 
and non-discriminatory prosecutorial process, and 
administers appropriate punishments to those 
who have perpetrated rape. The state’s obligations 
ushered in by the new Constitution to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil women’s right to freedom 
from violence gives added weight to the urgency of 
the law reform process. While comparative examples 
from the South African context provide useful 
guidance for that process, it remains to be seen 
what will be done in the Zimbabwean context, where 
the courts and the legislature face the challenges of 
operating in a highly politically contested environment 
with a severely depressed economy and a history 
scarred with violence.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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